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OF THE

Plaintiff-Appellant McQuen Forbush died of carbon monoxide poisoning on November
10, 2012 while staying at an apartment located in the Sagecrest Apartment Complex
("Sagecrest") in Meridian, Idaho. Mr. Forbush died in apartment #4624, an apartment in a
Sagecrest building owned by the Matthew E. Switzer Trust ("Switzer"). Mr. Forbush and his
girlfriend, Plaintiff-Appellant Breanna Halowell, were guests of the Apartment's tenant, Adra
Kipper.
The Sagecrest Prope1iy Owner's Association ("POA''), a non-profit corporation, is made
up of owners of individual Sagecrest apartment buildings, including the Matthew E. Switzer
Trust. At all relevant times, Defendant-Respondent Jon Kalsbeek was the president of the POA.
First Rate Property Management ("FRPM" or "First Rate"), a prope1iy management
company, contracted with the POA to maintain, inter alia, the common areas at Sagecrest. First
Rate also contracted with individual unit owners, including Switzer, to maintain the interior of
individual units.
Forbush/Halowell 1 brought three claims against Mr. Kalsbeek: (1) negligence; (2)
negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. On
January 15, 2015 the District Court, the Honorable Cheri Copsey presiding, granted summary
judgment with regards to all three claims in favor of Mr. Kalsbeek. Forbush/Halowell timely
appealed.

1 Mr. Kalsbeek utilizes the reference "Forbush/Halowell" to be consistent with the District Couti's characterization
of the Plaintiff-Appellants and to comply with I. A. R. 35(d).

1.

History.
not

as

As was their wont before the District Court below, however, Forbush/Halowell omit integral,
undisputed facts, including numerous undisputed facts relied upon by the District Comito render
its decision. Accordingly, the facts set forth herein are not disputes of the facts cited by
Forbush/Halowell; rather, they represent supplementation of the undisputed facts necessary to
understand the lengthy and complete factual history of this case and the basis of the District
Court's decision. Additionally, to the extent Forbush/Halowell editorialize and insert legal
argument and conclusions into their recitation of the facts, Mr. Kalsbeek does not concede the
efficacy of such.
Forbush/Halowell's factual recitation does not tell the complete narrative of the events at
issue, but rather selective facts are presented from a much greater universe thereof. Mr. Kalsbeek
supplements and fills in the narrative gaps left by Forbush/Halowell's factual recitation with
fmiher undisputed facts.
1.

Control of Unit Interiors.

Forbush/Halowell state that "Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA exercised actual control over
unit interiors." (Appellants' Br., 3-4.) In their supporting facts, however, Forbush/Halowell omit
the undisputed text of Article III of Sagecrest' s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions ("CC&Rs"), which differentiates between the areas of Sagecrest to be maintained by
the POA from those to be maintained by individual owners. Sectiqn 3.3 governs "Maintenance of
Lots and Four Plexes" and states in relevant part:
A.

The [Property Owner's] Association shall maintain the following:
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The following

B.

2.

All Sidewalks on the Property.

3.

All landscaping on the Prope1iy, including, without limitation, all grass
areas, shrubs, trees and bushes that are on Residential Lots and the
Recreational Center Lot, and all planters, whether they are on Residential
Lots or in the common areas.

4.

Drainage Facilities, including the Drainage Lot.

5.

The Common Areas.

6.

Any perimeter fence.

7.

The main lines, service lines, valves, and sprinkler heads of the PUIS
[pressurized irrigation system] on the Property to the extent that they are
not maintained by the Nampa Meridian Irrigation District.

The Owner shall maintain the following:

1.

The following portions of the exterior of each Four Plex: windows, doors,
exterior air conditioning units and all other exterior maintenance not
performed by the Association; and

2.

The entire interior of the Four Plexes, including but not limited to
flooring, ceilings, walls and wall coverings, appliances, plumbing and
plumbing fixtures, all interior components of the heating and air
conditioning system.

(R., 000539-000540 (emphasis added).)
Section 3.5 of the CCRs similarly delegates responsibility for unit interiors to owners:
"Each Owner shall have the exclusive right to ... , repair, ... or otherwise maintain, ... the
interior portions of their Four Plex, ... " (R., 000540.)
In accordance with the division of control between unit interiors and exteriors, First Rate
had two distinct agreements: (1) an agreement with the POA to manage exterior areas of

3

(R. 000098-000102);
owners

areas

as

owner thereof was responsible (R. 000104-000113 ).
Section 9 of the agreement between First Rate and owners such as Switzer governed
maintenance and repairs of the interior of a unit. Section 9 defines bi-annual preventative
maintenance, including dryer vents and smoke detectors, as an owner responsibility and grants
First Rate authority to incur expenses less than $250.00 without gaining prior approval of the
owner:
9.1

AGENT is authorized to make or cause to be made, through contracted services or
otherwise, all ordinary repairs and replacements reasonably necessary to preserve
and maintain the PREMISES in an attractive condition and in good state of repair
for the operating efficiency of the PREMISES, and all alterations required to
comply with lease requirements, governmental regulations, or insurance
requirements. AGENT is also authorized to purchase or rent, on OWNER'S
behalf, all equipment, tools, appliances, materials, supplies, and other items
necessary for the management, maintenance, or operation of the PREMISES.
Such maintenance expenses will be paid by the OWNER and through the
OPERATING ACCOUNT. AGENT shall not be liable to OWNER for any act,
omission, or breach of duty of such independent contractors or suppliers.

9.4

AGENT shall contract for bi-annual Preventative Maintenance at the expense of
the Owner. The contractor will check all plumbing and plumbing fixtures,
caulking, door stops, dryer vents, smoke detectors, and furnace filters and make
necessary repairs ...

9.5

The expense incurred for any one transaction shall not exceed $250.00, except
monthly or recurring operating charges and emergency repairs, unless otherwise
authorized by the OWNER, typically done via email.

(R., 000108 (emphasis in original).) First Rate possessed a power of attorney to effect an owner's
repair duties: "to order, direct, superintend, and manage all repairs, alterations, and
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general, to do and

to management

.... " (R., 000112, iJ l

2.

Management of First Rate bv the POA.

Forbush/Halowell state that "Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA's ability to micromanage [First
Rate Property Management] is expiained in part by the POA's power to hire, fire, and set
FRPM's compensation for managing unit interiors." (Appellants' Br., 4-6.) In their supporting
facts, however, Forbush/Halowell omit the undisputed fact that the POA and First Rate jointly
set unit rental rates based on First Rate's recommendations and premised on a comparative
market analysis: "Rental amount shall be detem1ined by mutual agreement between the Sagecrest
POA and AGENT. OWNER understands that the AGENT recommends rental amounts based on
a Comparative Market Analysis of similar properties within the areas of the OWNER'S
property." (R., 000106, ,i 5.3.) Forbush/Halowell also omit the undisputed fact that First Rate
had methods of compensation other than rental receipts in its contract with individual owners:
"At AGENTS discretion, a 5% fee of gross invoices for all labor and material arranged for and
contracted by AGENT for remodeling or repair of the PREMISES may be charged." (R.,
D00108, if 9.2.)
Regarding compensation of First Rate employees, it is undisputed that the POA
compensated only those First Rate employees who were "fully assigned to the
ASSOCIATION'S premises and fully dedicated to the ASSOCIATION'S business." (R.,
000106, iJ 5.1.)
Forbush/Halowell also omit the undisputed fact that, pursuant to the contract between the
POA and First Rate, "the President of the [POA] is hereby designated as the authorized
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[POA] to give

10

',r

and

It is

at all

relevant hereto.

3.

POA's Power to Repair Sagecrest Unit Interiors.

Forbush/Haiowell state that the Sagecrest "CCRs specifically grant the POA power to
repair, maintain, and restore unit interiors, including through its agent, FRPM." (Appellants Br.,
6-7.) This statement is not an undisputed fact; rather, it is a legal argument and conclusion. The
undisputed facts relevant to this issue and omitted by Forbush/Halowell are set forth in Section
B.1 of this Statement of the Case, discussing control of unit interiors, supra.

4.

Awareness of CO Issues.

Forbush/Halowell state that "ML Kalsbeek and the POA were long aware of the deadly
CO threat." (Appellants' Br., 7-8.) In their supporting facts, however, Forbush/Halowell omit the
undisputed fact that First Rate and the POA recognized and proceeded with the understanding
that replacement of faulty water heaters was an interior, and thus owner, issue. In mid to late July
2011, the POA officers had a string of emails related to the replacement of water heaters wherein
Jon Kalsbeek noted to the other POA officers that "FRPM is working with each owner that has
this brand of water heater - to deal with replacement." (R. 000897.)
On July 20, 2011, Tara Gaertner of First Rate confirmed that the water heater was an
interior, owner issue:
I talked to Jon about this last night, he said since this is an owner expense that I'll have to
send something to the owners and have them decide what they want to do ... If the
owners decide they do not want to then they will have to sign a waiver basically stating
that if a tenant dies FRPM & Intermountain Gas is not held liable for it ... I am
delivering notices to all doors today.
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also July 21,

000368.)

Sheila
want to

water
owners

On July 29, 2011 Ms. Thomason sent owners an email regarding the CO issues and
confirmed that replacement of water heaters was an interior, owner issue:
As owners you are required to provide a safe iiving environment ... l will need a written
response from each of you for documentation purposes ... Please let me know which
building you own and ifl have approval to replace your water heater(s) listed.
(R., 691-693.)
On August 3, 2011 Mr. Kalsbeek wrote to Tony Drost of First Rate and reiterated that
"the water heaters are interior items of each unit and is therefore an owners [sic] choice on how
to handle this situation, not the POA. This makes the costs for inspections and evaluations an
owner may request, owner responsibility." (R., 000786.) Tony Drost, President of First Rate,
responded by affirming that"[ e]veryone understands that" water heater replacement was an
owner issue. (Id.)
Sagecrest held an annual meeting on October 31, 2011 which Switzer attended. (R.,
000221.) The minutes thereof reflect that the replacement of water heaters was discussed and
characterized as an owner issue:
C.

SMELL OF GAS AND WATER HEATER REPLACEMENT

President Kalsbeek requested FRPM to send a rep01i showing which units have
had the above work done. This list should show which units have had the work done as
well as the name of the new water heater and current cost to include parts and labor.
It was requested that the Sagecrest Resident Managers test for CO at the time they
are replacing the filters and notify the appropriate owner should there be concerns to
discuss options.

Upon turnovers, '"'-''"UL,ll Managers are to encourage owners to replace the
detectors near the water
a dual
smoke
that
current
plug

uu,·vn~

It was requested that FRPM send out a master list showing exactly which units
have had what work done on them. Additionally, they would like a list of pricing and
manufacturer and model number for all major appliances (refrigerators, stove,
microwaves, dishwashers, washers and dryers) as some owners state that they were able
to find them cheaper, which shouid not be the case. This list should include the pricing
for Freeze stats, PRY, expansion tank, water heater replacement, fresh air vent
replacement, installation of louvers on closet doors, and cost of CO/smoke detectors.
Also, include the cost to install the A/C condenser locks to protect from huffing?
(R., 000222-000223.)
On November 9, 2011 Ms. Gaertner of First Rate emailed all unit owners regarding
maintenance matters, including water heater replacement options and hard-wired CO detector
installation options, and asked the owners to "let me know what you would like to have done and
I can get that scheduled as soon as possible." (R., 000228-000229.) Switzer responded to Ms.
Gaertner's email the same day, stating that he was "trying to weigh costs vs benefits." (R.,
000231.)
In early 2012 First Rate posted a written notice regarding CO issues on individual unit
doors, including Unit #4624. The notice informed tenants that the "owner of your property has
been informed of the situation. [Water heaters] are scheduled for replacement starting on
Monday until the job is complete." (R., 000239.) Furthermore, it is undisputed that Ms. Kipper
removed the batteries from the CO detector in Unit #4624 approximately two to three weeks
before the death of Mr. Forbush, and that there were no batteries in the CO detector when Mr.
Forbush's death occurred. (R., Aug. p. 42.)
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Hard-Wired CO Detector Installation.
state that "Mr. Kalsbeek
installation." (Appellants' Br., 8-11.) In their suppmiing facts, however, Forbush/Halowell omit
the undisputed text of the agreement between First Rate and property owners which permitted
First Rate to perform interior repairs not exceeding $250.00 without owner approval:
9.5

The expense incurred for any one transaction shall not exceed $250.00, except
monthly or recurring operating charges and emergency repairs, unless otherwise
authorized by the OWNER, typically done via email.

(R., 000108 (emphasis in original).) Forbush/Halowell frniher omit the undisputed fact that on
November 9, 2011 Ms. Gaertner of First Rate emailed Switzer as the owner of Unit #4624 and
informed Switzer of options for dealing with the CO issues, including replacing the water heater
at a cost of $650.00 and installing a hard-wired CO detector at a cost of $62.48. (R., 000228000229). It is undisputed that Mr. Switzer declined both options. (R., 000231; see also
R.000964.)
6.

Professional Preventive Maintenance.

Forbush/Halowell state that "Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA controlled whether a
professional plumber would be hired to perform preventive maintenance." (Appellants' Br., 11.)
In their supporting facts, however, Forbush/Halowell omit the undisputed text of the agreement
between First Rate and property owners such as Switzer which permitted First Rate to contract
for bi-annual preventive maintenance at an owner's expense:
9.4

AGENT shall contract for bi-annual Preventative Maintenance at the expense of
the Owner. The contractor will check all plumbing and plumbing fixtures,
caulking, door stops, dryer vents, smoke detectors, and furnace filters and make
necessary repairs ...

9

000108 (emphasis in original).) Furthermore, F orbush/Halowell editorialize
"objected" to professional

on April 1

stating that

2011, but the

of Mr. Kalsbeek's email speaks for itself. (R., 000424.)

7.

CO Warnings.

Forbush/Haioweil state that "Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA controlled whether owners and
tenants would receive adequate warnings of the deadly CO threat." (Appellants' Br., 12-13.) In
their suppo1iing facts, however, Forbush/Halowell omit the undisputed text of the warning
posted on all units, including Unit #4624, by First Rate in early 2012 regarding CO issues, which
reiterated that replacement of water heaters was an owner issue and was pending: "The owner of
your property has been informed of the situation. [Water heaters] are scheduled for replacement
stmiing on Monday until the job is complete." (R., 000239.) Furthermore, it is undisputed that
Ms. Kipper removed the batteries from the CO detector in Unit #4624 approximately two to
three weeks before the death of Mr. Forbush, and that there were no batteries in the CO detector
when Mr. Forbush's death occurred. (R., Aug. p. 42.)

C.

Procedural Hist01y.
Forbush/Halowell brought diverse and numerous claims against diverse and numerous

defendants: Sagecrest POA; POA officers Jon Kalsbeek, Jay Arla, Chris Schwab, David
Meisner; First Rate Property Management; First Rate President Tony Drost; Sagecrest
Development, LLC; Park Center Plumbing, Inc.; Widgeon Mechanical, LLC; A. 0. Smith, Inc.;
Matthew Switzer; Matthew E. Switzer, Trust; Anfinson Plumbing, LLP; Goodman
Manufacturing Company, LP; Anfinson Plumbing, LLP; Daniel Bakken; H&H Properties, LLC;
and Intermountain Gas Company. (R., 000001.)
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It is

that Forbush/Halowell asserted
)

against Mr. Kalsbeek as

000620-00062

(R., 000622-000623.); and (3) intentional infliction of emotional harm (R., 000612-000613.).
Indeed, Forbush/Halowell's Fourth Amended Complaint, the operative complaint in this case,
makes only four factual allegations regarding the individual POA Officers in its 190 paragraphs:
On information and belief, First Rate informed the president and officers of the
Sagecrest POA and building owner the trustee of the Matthew E. Switzer, Trust of the
dangerous conditions caused by the defective water heaters well before November 10,
2012. However, despite this knowledge, none of these defendants took the appropriate
action to rectify or alleviate the deadly situation that existed in Building 46 and
throughout the Sagecrest complex. (R., 000606, ,r 33.)
Following PFC Forbush's death, the Sagecrest POA, and each of its officers
named herein sent a letter to First Rate prohibiting First Rate from warning other tenants
of the dangers at the complex. 'I am instructing you to make no comments and to have
no discussion with anyone, whether media representatives, tenants, owners, or anyone
concerning the recent events at Sagecrest involving the death of a young man as the
alleged result of CO poisoning.' (R., 000608, ,r 42.)
In September 2011, the Sage crest Board of Directors approved a contract with
Engineering Consultants Incorporated "ECI," a local engineering firm, to conduct a
'Water Heater Site Investigation' at Sagecrest. ECI confirmed the problem was with the
'flame arrestor' or intake vent clogging on A.O. Smtih water heaters and reported its
:findings to the Sagecrest Board of Directors and First Rate. (R., 000609, ,r 49.)
Defendant Kalsbeek interceded after the March 2012 meeting with Intennountain
Gas and directed First Rate personnel to disregard the testing procedures as instructed by
Intermountain Gas. Kalsbeek directed First Rate not to test the water heater flu, but to test
in the apartment. (R., 000610, ,r 53.)
ISSUES ON APPEAL

As characterized by Forbush/Halowell, there exist four issues on appeal:
1.

Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether Mr. Kalsbeek
and the POA owed premises liability duties.

2.

Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether Mr. Kalsbeek
and the POA owed duties resulting from voluntary undertakings.
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Genuine issues material
preclude
vicariously liable
FRPM's acts
om1ss1ons.

on

Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on
liable for his own acts and omissions-regardless of capacity.

lS

. Kalsbeek is

ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL - ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

5.

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Ruies 35(b)(5), 40, and 41(a), Idaho Code § 12-121, and I.
R. C. P. 54, Mr. Kalsbeek is entitled to an award of his costs and attorney fees incurred
on appeal.
ARGUMENT

A.

Standard ofAppellate Review.
"Appellate review of a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the

same as that required of the district judge when ruling on the motion." Steele v. Spokesman-

Review, 138 Idaho 249,251, 61 P.3d 606,608 (2002). Under I. R. C. P. 56(c), summary
judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I. R. C. P. 56(c). This Corni must
"liberally construe ... the record in favor of the party opposing the motion and draw ... all
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Steele, 13 8 Idaho at 251, 61 P.3d at
608. Summary judgment is not appropriate "[i]f the evidence is conflicting on material issues, or
ifreasonable minds could reach different conclusions." Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 540,
960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998).
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has clarified the standard of review utilized in
reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to reconsider. "[W]hen the district court grants
summary judgment and then denies a motion for reconsideration, 'this Court must determine

presented a genuine
means the

fact to

the

judgment'

a

nova."

Bremer, LLC v. E. Greenacres Irrigation Dist., 155 Idaho 736,744,316 P.3d 652, 660 (2013)
(quoting Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012)).
One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule "is to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupp01ied claims or defenses." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
(1986) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, analogous to I. R. C. P. 56); see also Chacon v. Sperry

Corp., 111 Idaho 270,275, 732 P.2d 814 819 (1986) ("[P]art of the reason for adopting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Idaho, and interpreting our own rules adopted from the
federal courts as uniformly as possible with the federal cases, was to establish a uniform practice
and procedure in both the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho."). Summary judgment is
not "a disfavored procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[] by which factually
insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the
attendant unwarranted consumpt10n of public and private resources." Celotex Corp., 4 77 U.S. at
327.
Forbush/Halowell scantly discussed the appellate standard ofreview in their opening
brief, but such standard is of heightened criticality in this case for two reasons. First, a dispute of
material fact must be both genuine and material in order to defeat a properly supported motion
for summary judgment. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties wilJ not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment ... :"

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Rather, there must be no genuine
dispute as to any material fact in order for a case to survive summary judgment. Material facts
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are

might affect the outcome of the suit.

at

"Disputes over irrelevant or

T

not preclude a

V.

Elec. Contractors Ass 'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
Thus, a dispute of fact that is either conjured from the ether or irrelevant to the issues at
hand is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Forbush/Halowell have taken a
scattershot approach to their appeal, eliciting numerous facts that do not create genuine issues
and are not relevant to the issues before the Court, presumably in the hope that simply by stating
enough facts, a genuine issue of material fact will be presumed, when in truth no such genuine,
material factual dispute exists.
Second, only reasonable inferences may be drawn from the undisputed facts.
Unreasonable and unsupported inferences may not be permissibly drawn and are likewise
insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for sum111ary judgment. Where a party
opposing summary judgment fails to produce "substantial factual evidence to combat summary
judgment and there is 'overwhelming evidence' favoring the moving party, it may be
unreasonable to draw an inference contrary to the movant's interpretation of the facts, and
therefore a summary judgment would be appropriate even when [state of mind] is at issue."

Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676,681 (9th Cir.1985) (citations omitted).
For example, a pmiy opposing a motion for summary judgment may not reasonably infer
that a paiiy was negligent simply based on an undisputed fact that the party was driving a vehicle
that was involved in a collision. Such inference stretches a lone undisputed fact beyond its
breaking point. In this case Forbush/Halowell have drawn a number of significant inferences
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cannot

supported by

undisputed facts underlying them, and

are

B.

unreasonable

supported

Mr. Kalsbeek Owed Forbush/Halowell No Individual Premises Liability Duties.
Forbush/Halowell's first assigned error concerns premises liability duties. (Appellants'

Br., i4-i7.) ForbushiHaloweii, however, did not raise a premises liability theory of negligence

with regards to Mr. Kalsbeek individually before the District Court. (Tr., 92-112; R., 000645000664.) It is important to bear in mind the difference between (1) a premises liability-based
negligence claim against the POA as an entity; and (2) a premises liability-based negligence
claim against Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual. The first claim requires a right to control the
premises on the part of the POA as an entity. The second claim requires a right to control the
premises on the part of Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual.
Not only did ForbushiHalowell fail to argue a theory of premises liability before the
District Court, they did not even assert a claim of premises liability against Mr. Kalsbeek as an
individual. In asserting their negligence claim against Mr. Kalsbeek, Forbush/Halowell alleged
that "Defendant[ ] ... Jon Kalsbeek ... owed PFC Forbush and Breanna Halowell a duty to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances." (R., 000612, ,i 66.) In alleging a "duty to
exercise

reasonable

care

under the

circumstances"

on

the

pa1i

of Mr

Kalsbeek,

Forbush/Halowell are affirmatively declining to allege premises liability because reasonable care
under the circumstances is not the standard of care owed under a premises liability theory of
negligence. Rather, the standard of care owed under a premises liability-based negligence theory
is determined by the status of the plaintiff:
Idaho courts have maintained that the duty of owners and possessors of land 1s
determined by the status of the person injured on the land (i.e., whether the person is a

5

invitee, licensee or trespasser) . . .
landowner owes an
the duty to keep the
hidden or concealed dangers ...
premises in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn
duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A
is
to share with the
licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land.

Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 399-400, 871 P.2d 814, 816-17 (1994). To validly
plead a premises liability claim against Mr. Kalsbeek, Forbush/Halowell were obligated to allege
their status on the premises, allege the corresponding duty of care, and allege how Mr. Kalsbeek
breached that specific standard of care. By pleading only a general "duty to exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances", Forbush/Halowell failed to plead a premises liability-based
negligence claim, as well as the requisite status of the plaintiffs and corresponding duty of care
owed.
Forbush/Halowell are thus foreclosed from now advancing a premises liability-based
negligence claim against Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual because appellate comi review is
"limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented ... below." State v. Vierra,
125 Idaho 465,469,872 P.2d 728, 731 (Idaho Ct. App.1994). See also Dominguez ex rel. Hamp

v. Evergreen Resources, Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 14, 121 P.3d 938, 945 (2005). (appellate courts will
not consider new arguments or claims raised for the first time on appeal.)

Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 272 P.3d 534 (2012) is directly on point
and forecloses Forbush/Halowell from asserting a premises liability-based negligence claim
against Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual for the first time on appeal. Enriquez asserted on appeal
that Idaho Power was negligent "in two respects: (1) by permitting the power line to fall; and (2)
by failing to have adequate safety measures in place to prevent injuries from the fallen power
line." Id. at 565,272 P.3d at 537. Idaho Power moved for a directed verdict, and Enriquez argued
only the second negligence theory in opposition thereto. Id. at 566, 272 P.3d at 538. The
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ruled that
on

was

asse1iing the
that it

not

negligence theory

issues raised for

time on appeal and Enriquez did not advance a theory of negligence based upon line failure
before the district court, we will address only the second theory of negligence." Id.
Applied to this case, Enriquez precludes Forbush/Halowell from asse1iing a premises
liability-based negligence claim against Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual because such claim was
not argued, or even pied, below. See also KEE Enterprises, LP. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 752,
101 P.3d 690, 696 (2004) ("This Court's longstanding rule is that it will not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal."); Grasmick v. Otis Elevator Co., 817 F. 2d 88, 89 (I 0th Cir.
1987) ("Mr. Grasmick may not raise a theory here which he failed to raise in the trial court"
because a party "generally cannot lose in a trial court on one theory and thereafter prevail on
appeal on a different theory." (quoting United States v. Lattauzio, 748 F.2d 559, 561 (10th Cir.
1984))).
Should the Court substantively consider Forbush/Halowell's premises liability-based
negligence claim against Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual, Forbush/Halowell allege that it was the
POA as an entity, and not Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual, that "actually exercised control over
important aspects of unit interiors .... " (Appellants' Br., 15.) Forbush/Halowell cite three areas
in which the POA exercised some manner of control: "(a) hard-wired CO detector installation;
(b) professional preventative maintenance; and (c) warnings to owners and tenants." (Id.)
Forbush/Halowell cite the fact that the Sagecrest CCRs "gave the POA Board absolute discretion
to deem an owner's maintenance of his or her property unsatisfactory", but such limited right of
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undisputedly did not inure to Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual,

to

as an

(Appellants' Br., 16.)
Forbush/Halowell's argument fails with regards to Mr. Kalsbeek individually because the
undisputed facts support no reasonable inference that Mr. Kalsbeek, as an individual and distinct
from the POA, exercised control over the interior of Unit #4624. The plain language of the CCRs
limited right of entry did not inure to Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual, only to the POA as an
entity. Furthermore, it is undisputed that under the CCRs, Sagecrest owners were responsible for
"[t]he entire interior of the Four Plexes," and "[ eJach Owner shall have the exclusive right to ...
, repair, ... or otherwise maintain, ... the interior portions of their Four Plex, . . .." (R.,
000540.)
Furthermore, Forbush/Halowell's argument wholly ignore the corporate form in
concluding that because the POA allegedly exercised control, Mr. Kalsbeek individually
exercised the same control simply by virtue of his role as an officer thereof. See., e.g., Idaho
Code § 30-30-406 (A member of a corporation is not, as such, personally liable for the acts,
debts, liabilities or obligations of the corporation.). Using this logic, Forbush/Halowell must
necessarily agree that a director of Wal-Mart individually controls real estate owned by WalMart as an entity, simply by virtue of holding office, and is personally susceptible to premises
liability-based negligence claims for injuries suffered thereon. Forbush/Halowell's argument
renders the corporate form a nullity, a legal fiction. Forbush/Halowell are, in effect, yet again
trying to make a veil-piercing claim without having so pled. Piercing the corporate veil is "[t]he
judicial act of imposing personal liability on otherwise immune corporate officers, directors, and
shareholders for the corporation's wrongful acts."

18

BLACK'S

LA w

DICTIONARY

1184 (8th

the
individuals liable
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thereby making

corporate debts or making

assets reachable to satisfy obligations

of the individual. Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 917, 591 P.2d 1078, 1084
(1979).
The District Court committed no error m concluding that Mr. Kalsbeek owed
Forbush/Halowell no duty as an individual.
C.

Mr. Kalsbeek Assumed No Individual Duties.

Forbush/Halowell's second assigned error concerns voluntarily assumed duties.

(Appellants'

Br.,

18-22.)

The

District

Court

concluded

that

Mr.

Kalsbeek

owed

Forbush/Halowell no duties in any regard: "So I'm granting summary judgment to Mr. Kalsbeek .
. . . There is no evidence and I want to emphasize that. Not just a dispute of fact that's material.
There are no facts here showing that there is a duty to Ms. Kipper." (Tr., 109-111.)
Forbush/Halowell argue that Mr. Kalsbeek voluntarily undertook three duties: (1)
installation of hard-wired CO detectors; (2) preventative maintenance; and (3) CO warnings.

(Appellants' Br., 18-19.)
Under Idaho law, the elements of a negligence claim are "(1) a duty, recognized by law,
requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3)
a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss
or damage." Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 328 P.3d 520, 528 (2014). "Absent unusual

circumstances, a person has no duty to prevent harm to another, regardless of foreseeability.
Idaho law recognizes two circumstances in which a person has an affirmative duty of care to
another: a special relationship or an assumed duty based on an undertaking." Beers v. Corp. of

19

Jesus Christ

1

Idaho 680, 686, 316

98

(2013).
Forbush/Haloweli contend only that Mr. Kalsbeek assumed a duty based on an
undertaking, and do not allege the existence of a special relationship between themselves and
Mr. Kalsbeek such as would give rise to a duty. "Even when an affirmative duty generally is not
present, a legal duty may arise if one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior
duty to do so." Baccus v. Ameripride Servs., Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 350 (2008). "In such a case, the
acting party has a duty to perform that act in a non-negligent manner." Beers, 316 P.3d at 100.
"When a paiiy assumes a duty by voluntarily performing an act that the party had no duty to
perform, the duty that arises is limited to the duty actually assumed." Martin v. Twin Falls Sch.

Dist. No. 411, 138 Idaho 146, 150 (2002). For example, "[a] beach-goer may assume a duty to
rescue a drowning swimmer in a non-negligent manner by undertaking to do so, but that same
beach-goer has no obligation to rescue anyone else." Beers, 316 P.3d at 100.
In the three contexts cited by Forbush/Halowell, the undisputed facts do not support a
reasonable inference that Mr. Kalsbeek, as an individual, aside and apmi from his role as an
officer of the POA, voluntarily assumed a duty of care vis-a-vis Forbush/HalowelL The District
Court committed no e1rnr in so concluding: "So I'm granting summary judgment to Mr.
Kalsbeek .... There is no evidence and I want to emphasize that. Not just a dispute of fact that's
material. There are no facts here showing that there is a duty to Ms. Kipper." (Tr., 110-111.)
It is imporiant yet again to bear in mind the distinction between claims against the POA

as an entity, of which Mr. Kalsbeek was undisputedly and officer and played an active role in the
affairs thereof, and claims against Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual. A member or officer of a
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Idaho

§ 30-30-406 (A

member of a corporation is not, as such, personally liable for the acts, debts, liabilities or
obligations of the corporation.). It is axiomatic that a plaintiff who slips on ice walking into
Amazon's corporate office does not have a cause of action against Jeff Bezos as an individual
based solely on Mr. Bezos's status as CEO of Amazon. Conversely, an officer of a corporation is
not immune from individual liability for his individual and personally tortious conduct simply
because of his officer status. If Mr. Bezos chose to personally drive an Amazon order to a
customer, Mr. Bezos is individually and personally liable to the extent he negligently fails to
yield at a stop sign and strikes a pedestrian in a crosswalk. In such instances the corporate officer
has personally acted and in so doing caused a tort.
In this case the undisputed facts lead to no reasonable inference other than the inference
that Mr. Kalsbeek took no personal and individual actions constituting a voluntary assumption of
a duty of care vis-a-vis Forbush/Halowell. As they did below to attempt to avoid this fatal flaw,
Forbush/Halowell repeatedly and unavailingly attempt to hold Mr. Kalsbeek personally and
individually liable for corporate actions of the Sagecrest POA. Mr. Kalsbeek's undisputed
actions were the actions of an active corporate officer and did not constitute a personal and
individual assumption of a duty of care.
1.

Installation of Hard-Wired CO Detectors.

Forbush/Halowell allege that Mr. Kalsbeek voluntarily assumed a personal, individual
duty with regards to the installation of hard-wired CO detectors. (Appellants' Br., 15.)
As factual support, Forbush/Halowell cite First Rate's Liz Loop's characterization of
Sagecrest's CO detector installation policies and procedures as "Jon's Way". (Appellants' Br., 8-

do not
a

detector

that

or attempted to install

Unit

Forbush/Halowell ignore essential, undisputed facts. It is undisputed that Section 3.3 of
the CCRs placed responsibility for unit interiors with the owners thereof. It is undisputed that
Section 9.5 of the agreement between Mr. Switzer and First Rate permitted First Rate to perform
repairs costing less than $250.00 without first obtaining Switzer's approval. It is undisputed that
on November 9, 2011 First Rate informed Switzer of the cost of water heater replacement, as
well as the cost of hard-wired CO detector installation which was less than $250.00, and that
Switzer declined to take action. It is undisputed that, pursuant to the contract between the POA
and First Rate, "the President of the [POA] is hereby designated as the authorized representative
of [POA] to give and receive notices, approvals, and instructions hereunder."
Given the entirety of the undisputed facts, it cannot be reasonably inferred that Mr,
Kalsbeek personally and individually assumed a duty, owed to Forbush/Halowell, to install a CO
detector in Unit #4624. Mr. Kalsbeek, as the president of the POA, was appropriately and
reasonably involved in the information gathering process related to CO detector installation, but
such involvement does not reasonably support an inference of voluntary assumption of a
personal duty by Mr. Kalsbeek.

2.

Preventive Maintenance.

Forbush/Halowell allege that Mr. Kalsbeek voluntarily assumed a personal, individual
duty with regards to the performance preventive maintenance in Unit #4624. (Appellants' Br.,
15.)

factual support, F orbush/Halowell allege that on

15, 2011

. Kalsbeek

to professional maintenance. (Appellants' Br., 11.) Forbush/Halowell do not allege
that Mr. Kalsbeek personally performed, or attempted to perform, professional maintenance in
Unit #4624.
The undisputed, plain language of Mr. Kalsbeek's April 15, 2011 speaks for itself insofar
as Mr. Kalsbeek asked questions regarding the cost of professional maintenance. (R., 000424.)
Furthermore, it is undisputed that, pursuant to Section 9.4 of the contract between Mr. Switzer
and First Rate, First Rate had the authority to, and was responsible for, scheduling bi-annual
professional maintenance at Mr. Switzer's expense. It is undisputed that, pursuant to the contract
between the POA and First Rate, "the President of the [POA] is hereby designated as the
authorized representative of [POA] to give and receive notices, approvals, and instructions
hereunder."
The undisputed facts do not allow for a reasonable inference that Mr. Kalsbeek
voluntarily assumed a personal, individual duty to perform professional maintenance in Unit
#4624. Mr. Kalsbeek, as the president of the POA, was appropriately and reasonably involved in
the information gathering process related to professional maintenance, but such involvement
does not suppmi an inference of voluntary assumption of a personal duty by Mr. Kalsbeek. Mr.
Kalsbeek's April 15, 2011 email regarding professional maintenance does not present a genuine
disputed fact as the plain language thereof undisputedly speaks for itself. There is no evidence
that Mr. Kalsbeek personally perfonned, or attempted to perform, professional maintenance in
Unit #4624. It is undisputed that First Rate was contractually obligated to schedule such
preventative maintenance at Mr. Switzer's expense.

CO Warnings.

Forbush/Halowell allege that Mr. Kalsbeek voluntarily assumed a personal, individual
duty with regards to CO warnings in Unit #4624. (Appellants' Br., 15.)
In support, Forbush/Halowell cite two instances in which Mr. Kalsbeek precluded First
Rate from sending CO information directly to owners or tenants: (1) a March 9, 2012 email
exchange with Ms. Gaertner of First Rate (R., 000738); and (2) the Ben Davis letter (R., 407408, 702.) Forbush/Halowell do not allege that Mr. Kalsbeek personally provided, or attempted
to provide, any warnings to Unit #4624.
Forbush/Halowell omit the undisputed fact that on October 31, 2011 CO issues were
presented to and discussed at the Sagecrest POA annual meeting. Forbush/Halowell also omit the
undisputed fact that on November 9, 2011 Ms. Gaertner of First Rate emailed Mr. Switzer
regai-ding CO issues and presented Mr. Switzer options for water heater replacement and hardwired CO detector installation. Forbush/Halowell also omit the undisputed fact that in early 2012
First Rate provided notice to all tenants, including those in Unit #4624, regarding CO and CO
detector issues. It is undisputed that, pursuant to the contract between the POA and First Rate,
"the President of the [POA] is hereby designated as the authorized representative of [POA] to
give and receive notices, approvals, and instructions hereunder."
The undisputed facts do not allow for a reasonable inference that Mr. Kalsbeek
voluntarily assumed a personal, individual duty to warn regarding CO issues in Unit #4624. Mr.
Kalsbeek, as the president of the POA, was appropriately and reasonably involved in the
information gathering process related to CO issues, but such involvement does not support an
inference of voluntary assumption of a personal duty to warn by Mr Kalsbeelc The undisputed
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demonstrate that owners

tenants were, in

warned of CO issues and, in

case of

owners, presented with options to address the same.
D.

Mr. f(afsbeek is Not Vicariously Liable/or FRPM's Acts and Omissions.

Forbush/Halowell's third assigned error concerns assumed duties. (Appellants' Br., 2225.) The District Court did not rule regarding this claim as related to Mr. Kalsbeek (Tr., 92-112),
for reasons discussed in greater detail, ante.
As a threshold issue, it does not appear Forbush/Halowell intend to advance this
argument against Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual. "A reasonable juror could find that FRPM was
the POA's agent ... ."(Appellants' Br., 22 (emphasis added).) "The POA exercised control over
FRPM's activities and prevented FRPM from taking specific actions .... " (Appellants' Br., 24
(emphasis added).)
Furthermore, it is undisputed that Forbush/Halowell asserted a claim of vicarious liability
against other defendants but not Mr. Kalsbeek: "Defendant First Rate is vicariously liable for the
negligence and/or recklessness of its President Drost." (R., 000615, ,i 80.); "Defendant Tony
Drost was personally negligent and/or reckless, or knew of and approved and/or ratified the
negligence and/or recklessness of First Rate's employees. Such breaches and violations are
imputed to the Defendants Sagecrest POA and Matthew E. Switzer, Trust, as at all times First
Rate was acting as the agent for these Defendants." (R., 000615,

,ri! 75-76.)

Forbush/Halowell

did not present a vicarious liability argument against Mr. Kalsbeek to the District Court. (Tr., 97106.)
As discussed supra, appellate court review is "limited to the evidence, theories and
arguments that were presented ... below." State v. Vierra, 125 Idaho 465, 469, 872 P.2d 728,

1 (Idaho App.1994). Consequently, appellate courts will not consider new arguments
for the first time on appeal. Dominguez ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen Resources, Inc., 142 Idaho 7,
14, 121 P.3d 938, 945 (2005).
Substantively, assuming arguendo that the Forbush/Halowell asserted a claim of
vicarious liability against Mr. Kalsbeek and raised it below, such claim fails as the undisputed
facts support no reasonable inference that Mr. Kalsbeek was First Rate's master with regards to
Unit #4624. It is undisputed that First Rate, in accordance with the division of control between
unit interiors and exteriors, had two distinct agreements: (1) an agreement with the POA, not Mr.
Kalsbeek as an individual, to manage exterior areas of Sagecrest for which the POA was
responsible (R. 000098-000102); and (2) separate agreements with individual owners to manage
interior areas of units for which the individual owner thereof was responsible (R. 000104000113). Thus, to the extent Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual had a contract with First Rate, the
subject matter of such agreement was limited to units owned by Mr. Kalsbeek. Specifically
regarding the Unit #4624, First Rate's agreement was with Matthew Switzer, not Mr. Kalsbeek.
(R. 000104-000113). First Rate's agreement regarding the exterior areas of Sagecrest was
undisputedly with the POA as entity and not with Mr. Kalsbeek as an individual.
E.

Mr. I(alsbeek is Individually Immune as an Officer of a Non-Profit C01poration.
Forbush/Halowell's fourth assigned e1Tor concerns Mr. Kalsbeek's individual immunity

as an officer of a non-profit corporation. (Appellants' Br., 25-30.) At the outset, it should be
noted that the District Comi never reached the immunity issue (Tr., 92-112), because it ruled that
Mr. Kalsbeek owed Forbush/Halowell no individual duties. Immunity is not implicated absent

Accordingly, unless

until Forbush/Halowell establish liability on

part of Mr.

Kalsbeek, any inquiry into immunity is premature and unripe.
Should the Court, however, choose to substantively address the immunity issue, the
undisputed and unrebutted facts lead to only to a reasonable inference that Mr. Kalsbeek is
individually immune from Forbush/Halowell's claims pursuant to Idaho Code§ 30-30-623.
Idaho Code § 30-30-623(1 )2 sets forth the standards of conduct for officers of a nonprofit corporation such as Sagecrest:
An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge his duties under that authority:
(a)

In good faith;

(b)

With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and

(c)

In a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation and its members, if any.

Section 30-30-623(2) permits an officer in discharging his duties to "rely on information,
opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if
prepared or presented by ... persons as to matters the officer reasonably believes are within the
person's professional or expert competence."
Section 30-30-623 also provides immunity for an officer who complies therewith: "An
officer is not liable to the corporation, any member, or other person for any action taken or not
taken as an officer, if the officer acted in compliance with this section." LC.§ 30-30-623(4).
Significantly, the immunity provided by§ 30-30-623(4}is not limited to an officer's liability to
the corporation or its members, but includes an officer's liability to any "other person." See also
Wisdom v. Centerville Fire Dist., Inc., 2008 WL 4372009 *1-*2 (D. Idaho Sept. 22, 2008)
2

Codified at Idaho Code§ 30-3-85 at the time of argument and briefing below .
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(adopting Report and
corporation are

of magistrate judge concluding "that the officers
from liability under Idaho's Non-profit Corporation Act, Idaho Code§

[30-30-623(4)] .... ").
In this case, it is undisputed and unrebutted that Mr. Kalsbeek discharged his duties as an
officer of Sagecrest in good faith, with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances. (R, 000531-000532.) It is further undisputed the Mr.
Kalsbeek reasonably believed that he was acting in the best interests of Sagecrest and its
members. (Id.)
Forbush/Halowell argue both that Mr. Kalsbeek's unrebutted testimony is (1) conclusory,
and (2) disputed. (Appellants Br., 29-30.) The key, however, is that Mr. Kalsbeek's testimony is
unrebutted and states undisputed facts which serve a burden-shifting function. See Northwest

Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835,838, 41 P.3d 263,266 (2002) ("If the moving
party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of
material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is
sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.) Now, long after the fact,
Forbush/Halowell argue that the facts set forth in Mr. Kalsbeek's affidavit are actually disputed.
Even assuming arguendo that assertion to be true, Forbush/Halowell chose not to rebut Mr.
Kalsbeek's affidavit below. Thus, on the record before this Court, Mr. Kalsbeek's affidavit is
unrebutted and Mr. Kalsbeek has properly supported his claimed immunity pursuant to § 30-30623.
It bears repeating, however, that the District Comi ruled that Mr. Kalsbeek owed no

individual duty, and was thus not liable, to Forbush/Halo,vell. Accordingly, the District Court
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not reach

issue of immunity, as immunity is only implicated

and when liability is

established. The District Court cannot have erred with regards to an issue it did not reach or
otherwise consider. It is thus premature to consider immunity issues unless and until individual
liability on the part of Mr. Kalsbeek is established and, for the reasons set forth herein, the
District Court did not err in ruling that Mr. Kalsbeek owed Forbush/Halowe1l no individual
duties.

F.

Mr. Kalsbeek is Entitled to an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal.
An award of attorney fees is appropriate where the appellate court is left with an abiding

belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226,231, 31 P.3d 248,253 (2001) (citations omitted). In
pariicular, an award will be made if an appeal does no more than simply invite the appellate
court to second guess a trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is well settled and the
appellant has made no substantial showing that the lower court misapplied the law, Johnson v.

Edwards, 113 Idaho 660,662, 747 P.2d 69, 71 (1987) (citations omitted), or on review of
discretionary decisions, when no cogent challenge is presented with regard to the trial judge's
exercise of discretion. McPherson v. McPherson, 112 Idaho 402,407, 732 P.2d 371,376 (Ct.
App. 1987). An award is also justified where the appellant raises arguments for the first time on
appeal. Turner v. Cold Springs Canyon Limited Partnership, 143 Idaho 227,230, 141 P.3d 1096,
1099 (2006).
In this case, Forbush/Halowell appeal the entry of summary judgment entered in favor of
Mr. Kalsbeek. The District Court found that there existed no disputed issues of material fact and
that Mr. Kalsbeek was entitled to entry of summary judgment in his favor as a matter oflaw. The
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same arguments or have presented entirely new
arguments not raised before the District Court, and omitted numerous, critical undisputed facts to
the point of submitting an openly misleading factual representation. Mr. Kalsbeek has been
forced to defend this appeal and incur substantial attorney fees. There is no evidence that the trial
court misapplied the law or committed eITor. Accordingly, Mr. Kalsbeek requests an award of
attorney's fees on appeal.
Regarding costs, Idaho Appellate Rule 40 states that costs "shall be allowed as a matter
of course to the prevailing paiiy unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." The
Mr. Kalsbeek is unaware of any other provision of law which would forbid their recovery of
costs should they prevail. Accordingly, Mr. Kalsbeek asks the Court to award his costs as the
prevailing party.
CONCLUSlON

For the reasons stated herein, the District Cami did not err in its grant of summary
judgment in favor of Mr. Kalsbeek. Accordingly, the District Comi's decision is appropriately
affirmed. Further, Mr. Kalsbeek should be awarded attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this ?,I~ay of August, 2016.
BARNUM HOWELL,
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